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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 12-1886
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JULIUS GREER,
a/k/a POONY
Julius Greer,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(No. 2:10-cr-00711-001)
District Judge: Hon. John R. Padova
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 19, 2013
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES, and BARRY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 12, 2013)
____________
OPINION
___________
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted defendant Julius Greer of robbery and three related offenses.
Greer appeals his conviction on two grounds. First, he argues that the District Court

should have dismissed the indictment because of Speedy Trial Act violations. Second, he
argues that the jury charge on reasonable doubt was plainly erroneous and demands
reversal. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm Greer‟s conviction.
I.
The charges against Greer arose from an October 2009 robbery that occurred in
the offices of UACT, a property management company located near Drexel University in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Two men, Patrick Hancotte and Sean Stock, entered the
office under the guise of looking for an apartment to rent. Once inside, they pointed a
gun1 at one of UACT‟s owners, beat her with a crow bar, bound her hands and feet, and
covered her mouth with duct tape. They then stole jewelry and other items from the
office. Ebony Long, who is Greer‟s first cousin and was Stock‟s fiancée at the time,
assisted the two men. All four individuals were ultimately charged in connection with
the robbery. All except Greer pled guilty — Long entered into a plea agreement with the
Philadelphia District Attorney‟s Office and Stock and Hancotte entered into plea
agreements with the U.S. Attorney‟s Office. The three testified against Greer at trial and
claimed that Greer had orchestrated the robbery.
On October 28, 2010, a grand jury returned a four-count indictment that charged
Greer with conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, and two weapons offenses. On
August 12, 2011, Greer moved to dismiss the indictment for violations of the Speedy
Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq. The District Court denied the motion, concluding

1

At trial, the victim testified that both men had guns.
2

that only forty-eight days had elapsed on the speedy trial clock. Greer was ultimately
tried over five days in October 2011. A jury convicted him on all counts and the District
Court sentenced Greer to a total term of 180 months of imprisonment followed by a fiveyear term of supervised release and ordered him to pay $1,400 in restitution.
Greer appeals, arguing that the District Court erred when it denied his motion to
dismiss the indictment and that the jury instruction on reasonable doubt was plainly
erroneous. We will address each claim of error in turn.
II.2
We ordinarily review a district court‟s compliance with the Speedy Trial Act de
novo and the factual determinations underlying the court‟s findings for clear error.
United States v. Rivera Constr. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 295 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). If we
conclude that a district court has properly interpreted the Speedy Trial Act, we will
review the court‟s grant or denial of a motion for a continuance for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 870 (3d Cir. 1992); see also United States v.
Adedoyin, 369 F.3d 337, 341 (3d Cir. 2004). When ruling on a defendant‟s motion to
dismiss an indictment for Speedy Trial Act violations, the district court must identify and
tally the days included on the speedy trial clock and count toward the seventy-day limit.
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 507 (2006).

2

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
over Greer‟s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3

A.
Greer raises four claims of error with respect to the District Court‟s Speedy Trial
Act calculations. Though Greer moved to dismiss the indictment before the District
Court, the Government argues that by failing to raise these specific claims of error
contemporaneously or in his motion to dismiss, Greer has waived — or at least forfeited
— the right to pursue those arguments on appeal.
The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant be brought to trial within seventy
days of his indictment, information, or arraignment, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. §
3161(c)(1).3 After the deadline passes, a defendant may move to dismiss the charges
against him and the indictment “shall be dismissed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). A
defendant who does not move for dismissal before trial waives his right to appeal on
speedy trial grounds. Id. (“Failure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial . . .
shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.”). As a result, a
defendant who does not move to dismiss below has no recourse on appeal. See United
States v. Belton, 520 F.3d 80, 82 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that when a defendant fails
to move for dismissal prior to trial, “even plain error review is unavailable” (quotation
marks omitted)). However, the Speedy Trial Act does not specify whether a defendant
must raise every potential speedy trial violation argument before the district court in
3

Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act to effectuate the Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial, but the seventy-day limit in the Speedy Trial Act exceeds the protections
required by the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 870 & n.5 (3d
Cir. 1992). As a result, a defendant can assert a Speedy Trial Act violation without
asserting a constitutional violation. See id. Greer does not assert a constitutional
violation.
4

order to preserve the issue for appeal or whether moving for dismissal is enough to
preserve all Speedy Trial Act-related arguments. The Government contends that Greer
has waived the right to assert all arguments not specifically raised below.
The Government primarily relies on a decision from the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2006). Gamboa
involved a provision of the Speedy Trial Act that imposes a thirty-day time limit between
arrest and indictment. Id. at 803-04. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
rejected the defendant‟s Speedy Trial Act challenge, concluding that Gamboa “waived
his right to appeal this particular speedy trial issue by failing to move for dismissal of
Count Four on this ground prior to his trial in the district court.” Id. at 804. However,
the procedural posture that brought Gamboa before the Court of Appeals is unclear.
Though the opinion refers generally to “motions to dismiss,” id. at 800, it does not
specify whether Gamboa moved for dismissal of Count Four, contained in a superseding
indictment, on any ground below. Id. at 804.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has also suggested — without deciding
— that a “pretrial motion to dismiss . . . [based on] an entirely separate 104-day period”
from the period contested on appeal would not preserve all Speedy Trial Act arguments
for appeal. United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2012) (declining to
decide the waiver argument because the defendant could not establish plain error); see
also United States v. O‟Connor, 656 F.3d 630, 638 (7th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that a
defendant waives particular Speedy Trial Act arguments by failing to raise them in a
motion to dismiss before the district court). Other Courts of Appeals to address the
5

question apply plain error review when a defendant does not raise a specific speedy trial
argument before the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 497 F.3d 673, 676
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (reviewing for plain error when defendant moved to dismiss below
based on a separate provision of the Speedy Trial Act).
We hold that Greer has not waived his right to appeal on the grounds he raises
before this Court. Greer moved for dismissal of the entire indictment below and objected
to specific orders and excluded time periods that he again points to on appeal. The
Speedy Trial Act specifies the conditions for waiver: a failure to move for dismissal of
the indictment below. We decline the Government‟s invitation to read an extra
requirement into this plain statutory language: that a defendant must move for dismissal
and raise identical arguments before the district court. Instead, we will adhere to the
approach that we typically follow when a defendant raises new arguments on appeal: we
will review for plain error. See United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 203 (3d
Cir. 2006) (reviewing for plain error when party raised new theory on appeal).
B.
The Speedy Trial Act excludes some days from the seventy-day limit, including
delays that result from pretrial motions and continuances issued by the court. 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(1)(D)&(7)(A); United States v. Brenna, 878 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1989). Greer
contends that Judge Padova wrongfully excluded certain delays from the speedy trial
clock and that a total of one hundred and eleven non-excludable days elapsed between
Greer‟s indictment and his motion to dismiss.
1.
6

Greer argues that fifty non-excludable days elapsed between October 28, 2010, the
day of his indictment, and December 20, 2010, his initial trial date and the day he
contends that the first continuance took effect. On December 13, 2010, Greer filed a
motion for a ninety-day continuance, which the Government did not oppose. The court
issued an order on December 15, 2010, granting the continuance and setting the trial date
for March 21, 2011.
To calculate how many days have elapsed on the speedy trial clock, we will
exclude the day that started the clock and the day that an event that stops the clock
occurs. See United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining
that, to calculate “includable time” on the speedy trial clock, courts should exclude the
day of filing and the day of disposition); United States v. Arbelaez, 7 F.3d 344, 348 (3d
Cir. 1993) (applying Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)). Both parties agree that, as of December 13,
2010, forty-five non-excludable days had elapsed on the speedy trial clock. However,
Greer contends that an additional five days elapsed between December 15, 2010, the date
that the District Court granted the continuance motion and December 20, 2010, Greer‟s
initial trial date. The order, Greer contends, restarted the speedy trial clock, which
continued until the continuance went into effect on December 20, 2010, and again
stopped the clock. We cannot agree. On the contrary, the initial trial date no longer
existed after the court‟s December 15, 2010 order, which provided that “the criminal jury
trial . . . presently set for December 20, 2010, shall be continued beyond the time limits
established by the Speedy Trial Act, and . . . the delay resulting from this continuance
shall be excluded from speedy trial calculations.” Appendix (“App.”) 38. Because the
7

order was effective immediately, no additional days elapsed on the speedy trial clock
between December 15th and December 20th.
2.
Greer next argues twenty-three non-excludable days elapsed between April 4,
2011, the day the District Court ruled on his lawyer‟s conflict motion, and April 28,
2011, when the Government moved for a continuance. Two motions are relevant to this
time period. First, Greer moved for early disclosure of Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500,
material on February 17, 2011. Second, Greer‟s lawyer filed a conflict motion on March
15, 2011, just before the March 21, 2011, trial date set by the December 2010 order.
Though the Government complied with the Jencks request on March 15, 2011,
neither party notified the District Court. As a result, the court issued an order on March
16, 2011, that stopped the speedy trial clock until resolution of the Jencks motion. After
the parties notified the court that the Government had complied with the Jencks request,
the court promptly dismissed the Jencks motion as moot on May 9, 2011. Greer contends
that only thirty days are properly excludable as a result of the Jencks motion because the
Speedy Trial Act only excludes thirty days when a motion is unopposed and no hearing is
held. As a result, Greer argues, the speedy trial clock restarted on March 16, 2011.
Greer relies on a provision of the Speedy Trial Act that excludes “delay
reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any
proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court,” 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H), to argue that if a motion does not require a hearing, only thirty
days may be excluded from the speedy trial clock. See also United States v. Johnson, 29
8

F.3d 940, 945 (5th Cir. 1994) (relying on same subsection to conclude that only thirty
days are excludable when defendant moved to suppress evidence and neither party filed
additional materials). Yet another, more specific, provision of the Speedy Trial Act
governs pretrial motions and excludes “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the
filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition
of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). But see United States v. Felton, 811 F.2d
190, 197 (3d Cir. 1987) (observing that some courts have held that when there are
multiple pretrial motions, the thirty day requirement does not apply inflexibly, declining
to reach the issue, but assuming that a thirty-day limit applies). In light of Felton, we will
assume that only thirty days were properly excludable as a result of Greer‟s Jencks
request.
The Government argues that Greer‟s attorney‟s conflict motion, filed on March
15, 2011, would have again stopped the clock, presumably pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(1)(D). We agree. See United States v. Lussier, 71 F.3d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1995)
(characterizing motion to resolve a potential conflict in representation as a “pretrial
motion”). However, the clock began to run again after the conflict motion was resolved.
The court ordered the appointment of new counsel on April 4, 2011, and appointed the
new attorney on April 6, 2011. Twenty-three days elapsed on the speedy trial clock
between April 4 and April 28, 2011, when the Government moved for an ends-of-justice
continuance, which Greer concedes stopped the clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).
That motion remained outstanding until May 9, 2011, when Greer filed a motion to
suppress a prior statement.
9

As of April 28, 2011, sixty-eight days had elapsed on the speedy trial clock.
3.
Greer also argues that twenty-nine days were wrongfully excluded from the
speedy trial clock between May 24, 2011, when the District Court resolved his
suppression motion, and June 23, 2011, when the Government filed a motion to preclude
introduction of an alibi defense.
On May 25, 2011, the District Court issued an order granting the Government‟s
April 28, 2011, motion for a continuance,4 concluding — in language that mirrored the
Government‟s proposed order that accompanied its April 28, 2011, motion — that
“failure to grant this continuance would result in a miscarriage of justice, and would
unreasonably deny the government continuity of counsel and the reasonable time
necessary for effective preparation.” App. 221. The Government‟s April 28, 2011,
motion for a continuance revolved around the Assistant United States Attorney‟s conflict
with a May 9, 2011 trial date, an issue presumably moot by May 25, 2011.
On April 29, 2011, Greer responded that “the defendant does not oppose the
government‟s Motion and same should be granted,” though during a May 2, 2011,
hearing Greer‟s counsel represented that “[Greer] would like to enforce his Speedy Trial
Right.” App. 148, 151. Greer did not object to the May 25 order before the District
Court, either contemporaneously or in his August 2011 motion to dismiss the indictment.
Because Greer did not object, we will review for plain error and “may reverse[] if the

The May 25, 2011, order referenced Docket Entry 80, the Government‟s April 28,
2011, motion.
4
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error „seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.‟” United States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 (1997)); see also United States v. Sussman,
709 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that it is within the Court‟s discretion to
grant relief on plain error review).
An ends-of-justice continuance is the “most open-ended type of exclusion
recognized under the Act.” Zedner, 547 U.S. at 508. A district court must clearly set
forth “„either orally or in writing, its reasons‟ for finding that the ends of justice are
served” by a continuance. Id. at 506 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A)5). However, the
district court does not alone shoulder responsibility for enforcement: the Speedy Trial
Act “assigns the role of spotting violations . . . to defendants — for the obvious reason
that they have the greatest incentive to perform this task.” Id. at 502-03. Though a
district court may not “provide an after-the-fact justification for unauthorized delays by
granting an ends-of-justice continuance nunc pro tunc,” the court may “delay articulating
on the record its reasons for granting the continuance” if it has entered the continuance
order before seventy days have elapsed on the speedy trial clock. Lattany, 982 F.2d at
877. The requirement that a district court explain its reasons for entering an ends-ofjustice continuance “serves two core purposes”: “[i]t both ensures the district court
considers the relevant factors and provides [the reviewing] court with an adequate record

5

The 2008 amendments to the Speedy Trial Act moved this provision to subsection
(h)(7).
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to review.” United States v. Wasson, 679 F.3d 938, 946 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks
omitted).
When a defendant fails to identify an error below, courts of appeals have hesitated
to find plain error in a “district court‟s failure to identify, sua sponte” an alleged Speedy
Trial Act violation. Valdivia, 680 F.3d at 42 (declining to find plain error when law on
issue was unsettled). Here, Greer‟s failure to raise the issue deprived the District Court
of the opportunity to explain and clarify its reasons for granting the continuance. In light
of Greer‟s silence below — and his agreement to the proposed continuance — we cannot,
on the record before us, conclude that the May 25, 2011, order was plain error. See
Zedner, 547 U.S. at 499 (explaining that the Speedy Trial Act‟s statutory scheme “is
designed to promote compliance with the Act without needlessly subverting important
criminal prosecutions”). The May 25, 2011, order properly excluded the days that
elapsed until the Government filed its next motion on June 23, 2011.
4.
Finally, Greer contends that nine non-excludable days elapsed between July 18th
and July 28th. Greer objected to the disputed June 27th order below, but on different
grounds.6 As a result, we will review for plain error.
Again, two motions are relevant. First, the Government filed a motion on June
23, 2011, to preclude introduction of Greer‟s alibi defense. That motion stopped the
speedy trial clock. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). At a status conference on June 23, 2011,
6

Before the District Court, Greer contended that the Government already had sufficient
time to interview a potential alibi witness.
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the Government suggested that another ends-of-justice continuance might be appropriate.
App. 268 (“I don‟t want a delay of this trial, but it may be appropriate. . . in the interest of
justice, for all parties concerned . . . .”). During that status conference, the parties and the
District Court also set August 8, 2011, as the new trial date. On June 27, 2011, the court
entered another continuance: “it is hereby ordered that trial in this matter is continued
and that the period from the date of this order to the next trial date shall be excluded from
all computations of time under the Speedy Trial Act.” App. 288 (emphasis added). After
defense counsel notified the District Court and the Government that Greer had decided
against calling alibi witnesses, the court issued an order on July 18, 2011, that resolved
the June 23rd motion. Greer argues that the District Court‟s June 27th order could not
properly exclude all time until his August 8, 2011 trial date because the June 27th order
responded only to the proposed alibi defense, which was resolved on July 18th.7
During the June 23, 2011, status conference, the parties discussed a possible delay
for the Government to explore Greer‟s proposed alibi defense and the District Court
explained that it had no availability to schedule a new trial until August. The District
Court set a new trial date of August 8, 2011, before resolution of the alibi motion.
Nothing in the Speedy Trial Act requires, as Greer suggests, that the parties immediately

7

Greer also observes that on June 24, 2011, the District Court entered another order in
which it was “ordered that excludable time in the above-captioned case be computed and
entered in the record from the date of filing of the Government‟s Motion to Preclude the
Defendant‟s Introduction of an Alibi Defense . . . until such time that a hearing on said
motion is concluded or other prompt disposition is made.” App. 287. This order
excluded a delay resulting from a pretrial motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).
A separate provision of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), governs ends-ofjustice continuances, which provided the basis for the June 27, 2011, order.
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proceed to trial if the original basis for the continuance is resolved prior to the new trial
date or that the court issue a new continuance. Instead, the Act allows exclusion of
[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on
his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the
request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such
continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant
in a speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) (emphasis added). This subsection does not provide a “fixed
limit to the amount of time that may be excluded under the ends of justice provision” and
instead excludes “„any period of limitation resulting from a continuance.‟” United States
v. Vasser, 916 F.2d 624, 627 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Here,
the District Court excluded a reasonable amount of time for the parties to litigate the alibi
defense. The order that granted the continuance remained in effect even after the specific
issue that triggered the motion was resolved. The exclusion of the days between the June
27, 2011, order and the filing of the next pretrial motion was not plain error.
* * * *
No non-excludable days elapsed after April 28, 2011. In total, sixty-eight nonexcludable days elapsed on the speedy trial clock between Greer‟s indictment and trial.
We therefore hold that the Speedy Trial Act was not violated and we decline to reverse
Greer‟s conviction on this basis.
III.
We now turn to Greer‟s second claim, that the District Court‟s reasonable doubt
instruction was plain error. Greer concedes that he did not object to the jury charge

14

below. We may exercise our discretion to grant relief for plain error if we conclude “that
(1) there was error; (2) the error was clear or obvious; (3) the error affected the
defendant‟s substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of the legal proceeding.” United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 192, 211
(3d Cir. 2011).
When instructing the jury, the District Court first explained that Greer was
presumed innocent and that “[t]he presumption of innocence requires that you find the
defendant not guilty unless you‟re satisfied . . . that the Government has proved guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” App. 1180-81. The court then specified that “[t]he
presumption of innocence means that the defendant has no burden or obligation to
present any evidence at all, or to prove that he is not guilty.” App. 1181. Instead, “[t]he
burden or obligation of proof is on the Government to prove that a defendant is guilty,
and this burden stays with the Government throughout the trial. In order for you to find
the defendant guilty of the offenses charged, the Government must convince you that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” App. 1181. The court then instructed
the jury on reasonable doubt:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all
possible doubt, or to a mathematical certainty. It‟s not what it means. A
reasonable doubt is simply a fair doubt based on reason and logic and
common sense or experience. It is a doubt that an ordinary reasonable
person has, after carefully weighing all the evidence, and it is a doubt of
the sort that would cause him or her to hesitate to act in matters of
importance in his or her own life. That‟s what a reasonable doubt is.
Note, not beyond all possible doubt, not to a mathematical certainty, no,
okay?
15

Now, how can a reasonable doubt come into existence? Well, it may
arise from the evidence, or from the lack of evidence, or from the nature
of the evidence. All of those things could give rise to reasonable doubt.
Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if after careful and impartial
consideration of all the evidence in this case, you have a reasonable
doubt that this defendant is guilty of the charge, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of that charge.
Also, if you view the evidence on a charge as permitting either a finding
of guilty, or a finding of not guilty either way, equipoise, you should
adopt the conclusion of not guilty as the verdict on that charge, because
if it could go either way, then the Government hasn‟t proved it beyond a
reasonable doubt.
App. 1182-83 (emphasis added).
A trial court must explain the Government‟s burden to the jury, but “no particular
set of words is mandated.” United States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 1998); see
also Thomas v . Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 117 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[S]o long as the court instructs
the jury on the necessity that the defendant‟s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising
the jury of the government‟s burden of proof.” (quotation marks omitted)). However, a
“two-inference” jury charge suggests that the Government‟s burden is less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt by instructing that, when “the evidence reasonably permit[s] a
finding of both innocence and guilt, the jury should adopt the conclusion of innocence.”
United States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 1994). Though this type of charge is not
technically incorrect, it “by implication suggests that a preponderance of the evidence
standard is relevant, when it is not.” United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir.
1987). This Court has expressed disapproval of the two-inference instruction but has not
16

found it “so constitutionally deficient per se that is infect[s] the entire instruction on
reasonable doubt.” Isaac, 134 F.3d at 203; see also United States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d
1219, 1226 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the two-inference instruction, standing alone,
could not constitute plain error and observing that, to the extent the disputed language
carried an unfavorable inference, “we do not think the implication is a strong one” that
would render the instructions as a whole unconstitutional). Though we have not held that
the two-inference instruction deprives a defendant of his due process rights, we have also
concluded that it “should no longer be given without modification.” Jacobs, 44 F.3d at
1226.
In Isaac, the defendant objected to an instruction similar to the one in this case.
There, the disputed instruction noted that “if the jury views the evidence in the case as
reasonably permitting either of two conclusions, one of innocence, the other of guilt, the
jury should, of course, adopt the conclusion of innocence.” Isaac, 134 F.3d at 202. The
district court in Isaac also included language similar to the indisputably correct portion in
this case: “[a] reasonable doubt is . . . the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable
person hesitate to act.” Id. However, the Isaac charge provided additional explanation:
that “[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing
character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it, unhesitatingly, in the most
important of your own affairs.” Id. Greer asks us to conclude that the addition of this
second sentence to explain proof beyond a reasonable doubt cured Issac‟s defective twoinference language and that the absence of such language demands reversal in this case.
Both parties observe that the jury charge in Greer‟s case tracked the Third Circuit‟s
17

model reasonable doubt instruction except for the final paragraph that referred to
“equipoise.” However, Greer argues that adherence to the model jury charge is
insufficient in the face of the additional, erroneous language. In those circumstances,
Greer argues, the model language “cannot alone remediate the erroneous two-inference
charge” and further, correct explanation is required. Greer Br. 58 n.17.
The holding in Isaac, however, did not rest on the inclusion of the additional
sentence. In fact, the defendant in Isaac objected to the language that Greer now
characterizes as unconstitutionally absent. See id. at 203 (“Finally, Isaac objects to the
court‟s explanation that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is „proof of such a convincing
character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it, unhesitatingly, in the most
important of your affairs.‟”). Here, when instructing the jury on reasonable doubt, the
District Court properly “contrasted reasonable doubt with „all possible doubt‟” and
emphasized it did not require proof to an absolute certainty. See id. (“[T]he court
contrasted reasonable doubt with „all possible doubt‟ and „imaginary doubt,‟ and
explained that, while it was not „absolute certainty,‟ neither was it „mere conjecture or
speculation.‟ The court also stated the reasonable doubt was „a fair doubt‟ of the sort that
would make a person hesitate to act. We are satisfied that the court made appropriate use
of the negative examples.”).
The instruction in this case, though disfavored, satisfied the standards set forth in
Isaac and was not plainly erroneous. We will not reverse Greer‟s conviction on this
basis.
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IV.
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm Greer‟s judgment of conviction.
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